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Civil-Military from in Pakistan

2011-05-23T21:56:00.001-07:00

There is an absolute benchmark in civil-military relations: civilians have a right to be wrong. Advocates of military rule in Pakistan have argued that civilian leaders have not done their job in providing security, economic development, and arguably, even social cohesion. But the solution to civilian incompetence cannot be military intervention. Why is that?

The concept of modern statehood and governance has two consecutive levels of agency. The first is accorded by the people, presumably through free and fair elections, to elected leaders. This is a very broad appointment of agency, that is, the people empower the elected leaders to make decisions on their behalf. The second act of agency is accorded by elected representatives to specialised bureaucratic institutions such as the military. This is a narrow agency, what is called an "administrative agency," and requires the agent to follow the directions of the principal, in this case the civilian leadership, to good and bad decisions.

Militaries take over power by arguing that they are temporarily violating the second order of agency to be able to protect the first. The argument is predicated on the generals? claim that the civilian leadership has violated their trusteeship of public confidence, and in order to repair that primary relationship, the secondary administrative relationship must be broken as well. In effect, two wrongs will hopefully make a right.

The military?s logic in this context is incommensurate. The military?s approach of throwing out civilian governments is akin, if the saying could be reversed, to bringing a needle to a war (as opposed to bringing a sword to mend torn clothes). The first order of agency from the people to the government is a much larger problem than the relatively smaller second order of agency that the military violates when overthrowing civilian governments.

Moreover, the entire logic of military rule?we want to fix a broken system?necessarily implies that the military has to give up power once the system is fixed. There is an obvious problem with this argument: how does anyone, and especially the generals, know when the system is fixed and it is time for the military to get out? The timing issue is a difficult one. But given the conceptual limitation on the length of military rule, generals tend to lose whatever legitimacy they can muster faster than democratic leaders.

To remove a military from power requires a pact between moderates in the military and moderates in civil society. A military regime composed entirely of hardliners will believe that it can perpetuate its rule and will not allow any political liberalisation. This route ultimately leads to totalitarianism. Thankfully, Pakistan is not on it. An opposition of radicals, on the other hand, wants perfect democracy and the persecution of military officers who committed excesses during martial law. They scare even the moderate generals to want to keep their hold on power. Thus, an agreement of transfer of power between moderates on both sides holds the key to successful democratisation. We have seen this process at work in countries from Spain to Chile.

There is nothing no empirical proof nor a conceptual argument to suggest that military governments have ever been successful in any of the tasks they have set for themselves, including providing security. The example of how Argentina waded into a war of defeat over Falklands should be a salutary reminder of the fact that militaries when they are in government are unable even to provide security, their primary task as an institution. The use of force achieves its best results when combined with political initiatives. Even military officers know that the pursuit of political goals must guide armed action. A government that is in effect an instrument of coercion, however benignly led, becomes a government of one policy the use and the threat of use of force.

As for larger social, economic, and legal issues such as land reform, unemployment, education and other sectors, the military does not even usually attempt to bring change. What it can do and indeed often does primarily for the purposes of public relations' is to appear to bring political stability, when stability is a nothing more than a sign of inaction. As raucous as Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rule was, as corrupt as his son-in-law could be, and as air-headed as Mr Nawaz Sharif became, there was political action and movement in Pakistan. In comparison, General Ziaul Haq's period was the most sterile time in Pakistan. It was also the time when the middle-class began to flee from the country.

The moderates in civil society have to show certain characteristics. First, they must show a readiness to become involved with national security issues (conversely, it is in the interest of moderate generals to bring into the national security debate moderates from civil society). Second, they have to forgive and not insist on persecuting past regimes for crimes and corruption. This might sometimes include politically neutralising the radical opposition. This gives the democratisation game a forward rather than backward-looking perspective. Third, they have to assert the absolute standard of civil-military relations mentioned above: that elected officials have the right to be wrong even in national security decisions. This creates a political legitimacy for the civilian leaders and sets the rules that allow regime change negotiations to occur. Where this pact does not emerge, and a military government continues to extend beyond its organisational capabilities or moderates in the civil society are unable to neutralise the radicals and provide a vision of security, it leads to cataclysmic events that compel regime change.

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The international community, including the United States, has a major stake in Pakistan’s stability, given the country’s central role in the US-led effort to, in US President Barack Obama’s words, “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda; its war-prone rivalry with India over Kashmir; and its nuclear arsenal. As a result, US policy toward Pakistan has been dominated by concerns for its stability — providing the reasoning for backing Pakistan’s frequent military interventions — at the expense of its democratic institutions. But, as the recent eruption of protests in the Middle East and North Africa against US-backed tyrants has shown, authoritarian stability is not always a winning bet.

Despite US geopolitical support to the military, stability is not Pakistan’s most distinguishing feature. Many observers fear that Pakistan could become the world’s first nuclear-armed failed state. Their worry is not without reason. More than 63 years after independence, Pakistan is faced with a declining economy and pernicious insurgencies, mostly nested in, and radiating out from, its Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It is still struggling to meet its population’s basic needs. More than half of its people face severe and multidimensional poverty, which fuels resentment against the government and feeds political instability. In 2010, Foreign Policy even ranked Pakistan as number 10 on its Failed States Index, placing it in the ‘critical’ category with such other failed or failing states as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. The consequences of its failure would no doubt be catastrophic, if for no other reason than the possibility of al Qaeda and its affiliates getting hold of the country’s atomic weapons. The Pakistani Taliban’s dramatic incursions into Pakistan’s northwestern Buner District (just 100 kilometres from the capital) in 2009, raised the spectre of such a takeover.

Pakistan is, of course, a weak state with serious political, economic and security challenges. But it is not on the fast track to failure, ready to be overturned by warlords, militants or militias. Even though an emboldened and violent Islamist fringe is trying to monopolise the public sphere, Pakistani civil society has proved itself capable of resisting both state and non-state repression. Its numerous universities, assertive professional associations, vocal human rights groups and free (if often irresponsible and hyper-nationalist) media sharply distinguish Pakistan from the likes of Afghanistan or Somalia. The country’s political parties are generally popular and parliamentary democracy is the default system of government. And its bureaucratic and judicial branches still have plenty of fight left in them.

The military, moreover, is a disciplined and cohesive force which is unlikely to let the country slide into chaos or let its prized nuclear weapons fall into the hands of the Islamists (even though the power and growth of Islamists in Pakistani society is a consequence of the generals’ sponsorship of militancy in Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan).

But while the army is professional, it has no respect for the political system. It has not mattered whether the army is under the command of a reckless figure, such as General Pervez Musharraf, or an apparently more prudent one, such as the current chief of staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. As an institution, it deeply distrusts politicians and sees itself as the only force standing between stability and anarchy, intervening in politics whenever it decides that the politicians are not governing effectively, which is all too often a pretext used for the advancement or preservation of the military’s parochial organisational interests. These repeated interventions have weakened the country’s civilian institutional capacity, undermined the growth of representative institutions and fomented deep internal divisions in the country. In 2008, the military ostensibly staged its most recent retreat from government and politics. But the generals are reportedly back to their old tricks, propping up new political coalitions to ‘divide and rule’ from behind the scenes.

Pakistan is unlikely to collapse, but the imbalance of power between its civilian and military branches needs to be addressed if it is to become a normal modern state that is capable of effectively governing its territory. The best way to further boost Pakistan’s democracy will be by habituating the military to democratic norms and raising the costs of undermining democratic governance. That is easier said than done. But there are reasons to be optimistic. For instance, by amending Article 6 of the Constitution that deals with ‘high treason’, the current parliament has removed constitutional loopholes that military leaders used in the past to avoid prosecution for coups, and proscribed the judiciary’s frequent practice of legalising military rule.

While more direct attempts at exerting civilian control have backfired (for example, the government’s short-lived July 2008 decision to bring the ISI under the control of the interior ministry), these setbacks should not prevent civilian politicians from continuing to take measured steps to establish civilian supremacy. For instance, instead of staying out of defence policy completely, the civilian government should call regular meetings of the cabinet’s defence committee to discuss and make key national security decisions. Civilians should also try to ‘demilitarise’ the ministry of defence, subject military expenditures and defence policy to debate, and enact legislation to bring the ISI under democratic-civilian control. No less important, the government should appoint a special committee of the cabinet or parliament to scrutinise and approve top-level military appointments. All of this will not happen overnight, but the time for initiating the democratisation of civil-military relations was yesterday.

For its part, the international community, especially the US, must resist using the generals as shortcuts to stability, demonstrate patience with Pakistan’s civilian authorities and help them consolidate their hold on power. Some progress toward a resolution of the Kashmir conflict could help scale the military back and even reduce the attractiveness of using militancy as an instrument of foreign policy. External actors should help Pakistan and India in resolving their enduring rivalry, which not only threatens international security but has spilled into Afghanistan. In the meanwhile, they should clearly convey to the generals that any interference in the political or electoral process would seriously jeopardise external military assistance.

Pakistan is too important to be left to the devices of its generals. If their rhetoric is to be believed, Pakistan’s main parties, the PPP and the PML-N, are committed to the goal of keeping the military out of politics. Will they walk their democratic talk when the chips are down? Only time will tell. External actors have fared no better, sacrificing democracy for order. The results have been less than ideal, especially for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan urgently needs support from the international community to help stabilise its civilian institutions and to bolster its economy, which will cement public confidence in democracy. Only such support will ensure its reliability and stability as a partner in fighting militancy and terror.

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Pakistan can be described as a praetorian state where the military has acquired the capability, will, and sufficient experience to dominate the core political institutions and processes. As the political forces are disparate and weak, the military’s disposition has a strong impact on the course of political change, including the transfer of power from one set of the elite to another. Such an expanded role is at variance with the traditions and temperament of the military at the time of independence in 1947.

The Pakistan military inherited the British tradition of civilian supremacy over the military, aloofness from active politics, commitment to professionalism, and assistance to the civilian authorities with respect to law and order and national calamities. Its role expanded gradually. At first, it emerged as an important actor in the decision-making process, especially in defence and security affairs. In 1958 General (later Field Marshal) Mohammad Ayub Khan, Chief of Army Staff [COAS] from 1951 to 1958, overthrew the tottering civilian government. He ruled under martial law until June 1962, when a new presidential constitution was introduced which civilianised military rule through co-option of a section of the civilian elite. In March 1969, General Yahya Khan, COAS from 1966 to 1971, took power after Ayub Khan’s resignation in the wake of mass agitation against his rule. Yahya Khan abolished Ayub’s constitution and ruled the country under martial law until December 1971, when he was forced to hand over power to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, following the surrender of the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was temporarily successful in asserting the primacy of civilian government. He enjoyed popular support in the early stages of his rule while the military’s reputation had declined dramatically owing to the East Pakistan debacle. However, Bhutto’s assertion of civilian supremacy did not prove durable for three major reasons. First, his efforts to personalise power rather than work towards establishing viable participatory institutions and processes eroded his popular support. Second, in their determination to dislodge Bhutto, some of the opposition leaders made it clear in the later stages of anti Bhutto agitation in 1977 that they would not challenge the military in the event of his overthrow. Third, by 1977 the military had recovered from the shock of 1971. When the senior commanders found that the Bhutto regime was discredited and could not survive without their support, they retrieved the political initiative.

This was accomplished when General Zia ul Haq, COAS from 1976 to 1988, staged the third coup in July 1977, and governed under martial law until 1985. During this period he tailored a political system and carefully stage-managed partyless elections to ensure the continuity of his rule after the termination of martial law. When Zia ul Haq died in an aircrash in August 1988, the military allowed the constitutional process to become operative, facilitating the holding of elections and transfer of power to an elected leader, Benazir Bhutto. However, the military monitored the elected government’s actions and periodically commented on its performance. Differences developed between the military commanders and the civilian government over the government’s performance, which was considered unsatisfactory. The military joined with the president to dismiss the government in August 1990.

In addition to the privileges of exercising power, other considerations which impel the senior echelons of the military to maintain interest in politics include overall political stability, the size of the defence budget, security and foreign policy, professional interests, especially the autonomy of the military in its internal affairs, and corporate interests, including the privileges and benefits for military personnel, especially senior commanders.

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Spread Of Islam in the Sub-continent

2011-05-23T21:55:00.001-07:00

The last Prophet of Islam, Prophet Muhammad (SAW), completely changed the intellectual outlook of Arabia. Within a span of 23 years he transformed the barbarous and impious Arabs into a civilized and religious nation. During his life and also after his death, Muslims took the message of Islam to every corner of the world and within a few years Muslims became the super power of the era.

Trade relations between Arabia and the Sub-continent dated back to ancient times. Long before the advent of Islam in Arabia, the Arabs used to visit the coast of Southern India, which then provided the link between the ports of South and South East Asia. After the Arab traders became Muslim, they brought Islam to South Asia. A number of local Indians living in the coastal areas embraced Islam. However, it was the Muslim conquests in Persia, including the provinces of Kirman and Makran, which brought the Arabs face to face with the then ruler of Sindh, who had allied with the ruler of Makran against the Muslims. But, it was not until the sea borne trade of the Arabs in the Indian Ocean was jeopardized that serious attempts were made to subjugate Sindh.

During the reign of the great Umayyad Caliph Walid bin Abdul Malik, Hajjaj bin Yousaf was appointed as the governor of the Eastern Provinces. At that time, Raja Dahir, a Brahman, ruled Sindh. However, the majority of the people living in the region were Shudders or Buddhists. Dahir treated members of these denominations inhumanly. They were not allowed to ride horses or to wear a turban or shoes. Sindhi pirates, protected by Dahir, were active on the coastal areas and whenever they got a chance, they plundered the ships passing by Daibul.

During those times, some Muslim traders living in Ceylon died and the ruler of Ceylon sent their widows and orphans back to Baghdad. They made their journey by sea. The King of Ceylon also sent many valuable presents for Walid and Hajjaj. As the eight-ship caravan passed by the seaport of Daibul, Sindhi pirates looted it and took the women and children prisoner. When news of this attack reached Hajjaj, he demanded that Dahir return the Muslim captives and the looted items. He also demanded that the culprits be punished. Dahir replied that he had no control over the pirates and was, therefore, powerless to rebuke them. On this Hajjaj decided to invade Sindh. Two small expeditions sent by him failed to accomplish their goal. Thus, in order to free the prisoners and to punish the guilty party, Hajjaj decided to undertake a huge offensive against Dahir, who was patronizing the pirates.

In 712, Hajjaj sent 6,000 select Syrian and Iraqi soldiers, a camel corps of equal strength and a baggage train of 3,000 camels to Sindh under the command of his nephew and son in-law, Imad-ud-din Muhammad bin Qasim, a young boy of just seventeen years. He also had a 'manjaniq', or catapult, which was operated by 500 men and could throw large stones a great distance. On his way the governor of Makran, who provided him with additional forces, joined him. Also, a good number of Jats and Meds, who had suffered at the hands of native rulers, joined the Arab forces.

Muhammad bin Qasim first captured Daibul. He then turned towards Nirun, near modern Hyderabad, where he easily overwhelmed the inhabitants. Dahir decided to oppose the Arabs at Raor. After a fierce struggle, Dahir was overpowered and killed. Raor fell into the hands of the Muslims. The Arab forces then occupied Alor and proceeded towards Multan. Along the way, the Sikka (Uch) fortress, situated on the bank of the Ravi, was also occupied. The Hindu ruler of Multan offered resistance for two months after which the Hindus were overpowered and defeated. Prior to this, Muhammad bin Qasim had taken Brahmanabad and a few other important towns of Sindh. Muhammad bin Qasim was planning to proceed forward when the new Caliph Suleman bin Abdul Malik recalled him. After the departure of Muhammad bin Qasim, different Muslim generals declared their independence at different areas.

The Muslim conquest of Sindh brought peace and prosperity to the region. Law and order was restored. The sea pirates of Sindh, who were protected by Raja Dahir, were crushed. As a result of this, sea trade flourished. The port of Daibul became a very busy and prosperous commercial center.

When Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh, the local people, who had been living a life of misery, breathed a sigh of relief. Qasim followed a lenient policy and treated the local population generously. Everyone had full religious freedom and even the spiritual leaders of local religions were given salaries from the government fund. No changes were made in the local administration and local people were allowed to hold offices - particularly in the revenue department. All taxes were abolished and Jazia was imposed. Everyone was treated equally.

Poor people, especially Buddhists, were very impressed by his policies and many of them embraced Islam. A number of Mosques and Madrasas were constructed in important towns. In a short period of time Sindh became a center of Islamic learning. A number of religious scholars, writers and poets were emerged and they spread their knowledge. The Muslims learned Indian sciences like medicine, astronomy and mathematics. Sanskrit books on various subjects were translated into Arabic. During the reign of Haroon al Rasheed, a number of Hindu scholars were even invited to Baghdad.

The establishment of Muslim rule also paved way for future propagation of Islam in Sindh and the adjoining regions. Later Sindh also attracted Ismaili missionaries who were so successful that Sindh passed under Ismaili rule. With the conquest of Lahore by Mahmud of Ghazni, missionary activity began again under the aegis of Sufis who were the main agents in the Islamization of the entire region.

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The glory and splendor, the solid achievement and the established traditions, the sound administration and magnificent culture of the Muslims empire have been the significant features of the Muslims history of the subcontinent.

INTRODUCTON:
Arabs, as traders entered the sub-continent within a two years after their conversion to Islam. The Muslim traders played a very significant role in preaching Islam in the subcontinent, as Hitti remarks that it has passed through three distinct stages “originally a religion, Islam later became a state and finally a culture”.
The Arab Muslims conquered Sindh in the seventh century A.D. Sea faring and maritime interest of the Arabs on the coast of India were considerable even before Islam: and under a centralized government of Umayyad, the commercial activities expanded in the subcontinent. Mohammad bin Qasim, the conqueror of Sindh made Sindh Dar-ul-islam and based his policy on the Sharia; the laws of Islam. The majority of converts who entered the fold of Islam belonged to lower caste of Hindus to whom Islam at once brought that social equality which Hinduism had denied them from a long time. Arab missionary activities also played a significant role in the large scale conversion of Hindus. As T.W. Arnold says, “But for the arrival of the Portuguese, the whole of this coast would have become Mohammedan”.Feroze Shah Tughlaq in his autobiography writes, “I encouraged my infidel subjects to embrace the religion of the Prophet. The new converts were favoured with presents and honours”.

TRADERS AND GROWTH OF ISLAM:
Islamic influence first came to be felt in the Indian sub-continent during the early 7th century with the advent of Arab traders. Arab traders used to visit the Malabar region , which was a link between them and the ports of South-East Asia to trade even before Islam had been established in Arabia. According to Historians Elliot and Dowson in their book ‘the history of Indians as told by their historians’, the first ship bearing Muslim travelers was seen on the Indian coast as early as 630 AD. H.G. Rawlinson, in his book: Ancient and Medieval History of India y J. Sturrock claims the first Arab Muslims settled on the Indian coast in the last part of the 7th century AD.
The Arab merchants and traders became the carriers of the new religion and they propagated it wherever they went. However, it was the Muslim conquests in Persia, including the provinces of Kirman and Makran, which brought the Arabs face to face with the then ruler of Sindh, who had allied with the ruler of Makran against the Muslims. But, it was not until the sea borne trade of the Arabs in the Indian Ocean was jeopardized that serious attempts were made to subjugate Sindh.
Bab-ul-Islam: The invasion of Muhammad bin Qasim ushered the way for spread of Islam in sub-continent.But,to say that the invasions were reasons of spread of Islam is absolutely wrong because if it so then why Halaku khan could not succeed in spreading Buddhism anywhere in the World?
Preaching of Islam:
History is witness that there were some major groups of elements who preached, propagated and popularized Islam. Among them were Sufis, Ulemas and reformers. All are discussed below in detail:

A: SUFIS:
IN the Subcontinent, the Sufis made untiring, selfless and incessant struggle for the spread, growth and evolution of Islam. The spread of Islam stems from the invasion of Muhammad Bin Qasim in the Subcontinent, but roots of Sufism took shape and became an institution in the 12th and 13th century. The two great pioneers in this filed were Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani and Hazrat Shahabuddin Suharawardy. Four branches of Sufism, namely Qadriya, Chishtiya, Suharawardya and Naqshahbandya were introduced in the Subcontinent can be traced to the time when the first Sufi, Muhammad Alfi, came to the Subcontinent. It was their affection, sympathy, fraternity and unlimited philanthropist actions that won the hearts of people.
1. Shaikh Ismail Bukhari: CENTRE: CENTRAL PUNJAB (LAHORE)
Due to his attractive personality people accepted Islam in large number. Thousands of Hindus attended his sermons every Friday and it was generally believed that no unbeliever came into personal contact with him without being converted to Islam.
2. KHAWAJA MUIN-UDIN CHISHTI: CENTRE: RAJISTHAN(AJMER)
A Great Sufi, popularly known as ‘khowaja Ajmeri’ converted thousands of non-Muslims to Islam. While in Delhi on his way to Ajmer he is said to have converted Seven hundred Hindus to Islam. He also introduced ‘Chishtya silsila’ in India.
3. BAHA-UD-DIN ZAKARIA: CENTRE: SOUTH-EAST PUNJAB(MULTAN)
A highly educated person, Bahaudin Zakaria was the founder of ‘SHORWARDI silsila’ in India. His alluring personality and policy of public welfare impressed non-Muslims to embrace Islam at a grandiose scale.
4. FARID AL-DIN GANJ SHAKAR: CENTRE: FAR-NORTH-INDIA(PAKPATAN)
Farid was an eloquent Panjabi poet. With his elegant speech and wide spread message of peace, he became successful in winning hearts of non-Muslims.
5. NIZAM-UDIN-AULYA: CENTRE: NORTH-INDIA (DELHI)
His vision of the world was marked by a highly evolved sense of secularity and kindness. Historiographer Ziauddin Barani claims that his influence on the Muslims of Delhi was such that a paradigm shift was affected in their outlook towards worldly matters. People began to be inclined towards mysticism and Islam. His disciple Amir Khusro was reason of introducing new modes to Sufism, say Qawali’.
6. ALI MAKHDOOM HAJWERI:
Hazrat Ali Bin Osman Hujweri, popularly known as Data Ganj Bux. He was leading Sufi philosophers of the day. He did immense missionary work in his individual capacity and set an outstanding example for future generations.
Above all, it was the sheer straggle of the Sufis which paved the way for the future Islamic state in the Subcontinent. Had the Sufis shunned their practice of Islamic teachings in the 13th and 14th century, it would have been difficult to implant a Muslim civilization in the country where a well-organized Hindu community had lived for centuries

B.ULEMAS:
There were many disruptive forces at work in the Muslim community of post-Aurangzeb India. This was a period of social and political disintegration of Muslim India which was intensified by Hindus nationalism. This political situation was capriciously dealt by many Ulemas.

SHAH WALIULLAH:
Shah Walliullah found not only political but also spiritual downfall of the Muslims of India. The greatest and the most poisonous of them was the sectarian differences, between the Sunnis and Shia’s.Besides, economic and social factors were also responsible for that breakdown. He thought his first duty as a reformer was to reinterpret Islamic values. Shah Waliullah went back to the original sources of the Islamic law, the Quran and the Hadith.The socio-political condition of the Muslims also needed reforms. On economic front, Shah suggests that basic needs and requirements of human life should be fulfilled and the institutional development was essential.
However, apart from Shah Walliullah, there were many prominent Ulemas who did brilliant work for work of Islam and Muslim community. Among them, Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi (Mujadid Alif Sani) and Sheikh Abdul Haq were noteworthy.

C: CLERGY AND GROWTH OF ISLAM:
The Islamic clergy also paved the way for growth of Islam in sub-continent. Using their Friday sermons and power to issue fatwas they were able to exercise greater influence on the polity than were Hindu priests. With the rulers on their side, it was much harder to challenge them. Hence, there was a systematic cycle of Islamic preaching and way of life, which attracted liberal non-Muslims.

D: REFORMERS:
SIR SYED AHMED KHAN:
The whole blame and repercussions of war of independence fell over Muslims. The revolutionary personality took the task. According to the need of time, the policy of Sir Syed was based on unquestioned loyalty to the British government. He was the earliest modernist in the history of Islamic thought. When in 1867, the ‘Hindi-Urdu controversy’ started, Sir Syed gave the idea of ‘TWO-NATION THEORY’.Religiously,English missionaries produced literature designed to create doubts in the mind of the average Muslim. He managed to interpret those thoughts for western education with interest of Muslim nation. To save the Muslim from the charges of disloyalty and also raising the intellectual level of Mulsims,Sir Syed wrote immensely:” loyal Mohammedans of India”; a magazine “tahzib-ul-akhlaq”.His biggest achievement was creation a ‘British Indian Association Aligarh(which later resulted in creation of ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE) and Aligarh movement.
IQBAL: The poet philosopher Iqbal played an important role in stipulating the spirit into the Muslim nation in Indo-Pak. He became the greatest exponent of the Muslim Milat of the subcontinent. His words were mighter then sword. For awakening the Muslims from dead sleep, he says:

And for stressing unity in Muslim nation, he says:

Thus, though reformers like Iqbal were modern and final architecture of Muslim nation but their role in building a nation is liable for tribute.

E: RULERS AND GROWTH OF ISLAM:
Islam in sub-continent grew more strongly because of Islamic rule there.But, at the same time, it is wrong to assume that if missionaries had not received a fresh impulse under the Muslim dynasties, its propagation would have been checked. Islam grew more and more with or without the backing of political power to it, especially during the British rule. According to the Census report of 1891: “It is satisfactorily proved that since last twenty years, out of very 10,000 persons in Bengal, Islam has gained 650 persons.So,lets have a look that how MUSLIM rule helped in growth and evolution of Islam.

• INVASION OF INDIA:
With the political factor as reason’detre of invasion of Hindustan, Muhammad bin Qasim established first ever Muslim rule in India. Thus starts the history of Muslim rule in India.

• POLICIES OF MUSLM RULERS FOR ISLAM:
It is noteworthy to observe that the how the Muslim rulers supported the elements which were ingredients for growth and evolution in Islam. Let’s check the few examples:

A: SULTAN Mohammad Toghluq transferred numerous saints and Sufis to Daulatabad.
B: Masud, the son of Sultan Mahmud while coming to Lahore, brought with him Sufis like Ali Makhdum Hajweri of Ghazni.
C: Sher Shah Suri in his short reign played a particularly decisive role in creating several new urban centers particularly like Delhi and Rohtas.These urban centers were viewed as ‘MUSLIM COLONIES’.
E: Rulers like Ahmed Shah of Ahmadabad or Adil Shah of Bijapur maintained a relatively close connection with indigenous traditions. Ahmed Shah incorporated Hindu and Jain architectural motifs into his buildings without inhibition.
F: Mughal rulers like Akbar and Jahangir tried to be eclectic in their tastes, and others like the Deccan rulers encouraged unique local-flavored styles. Some of the more enlightened Islamic rulers invested in vital public works. This pretended them to be more an Indian ruler then a Muslim ruler.Thus, their non-Muslim subjects had good courtesy towards them and this helped in spread of Islam.

OTHER FACTORS:

• ECONOMIC POLICY AND EVOLUTION OF M.SOCIETY
Agriculturally developed societies played a crucial role in this transformation. The interests of the mercantile community were such that they wished agricultural taxes to be high but trade duties to be low. By and large, Islamic rulers implemented exactly such a regime. This enabled the founding of new trading and manufacturing centers that emerged wherever Islam took hold. For the desert areas of the world, Islam came as a big boon - providing wealth from trade that would have been unimaginable considering the poverty of the natural landscape.

• CULTURE, ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR CAUSE OF ISLAM:

The growth in migration, trade and development of Hindustan ushered the Muslim community and Islam in Hindustan. That is why historian call things like ‘indo-Islamic culture/architecture’. In culture,. In architecture, the use of ceramic tiles in construction was inspired by architectural traditions prevalent in Iraq, Iran, and in Central Asia. In technology, there is also the example of Sultan Abudin (1420-70) sending Kashmiri artisans to Samarqand to learn book-binding and paper making. Many Islamic rulers developed Karkhanas - i.e. small factories during their reign. Towns were hub of in particular industries.Like,Mirzapur for carpets, Firozabad for glass wares, Farrukhabad for printing, Lucknow for barware, Srinagar for papier-mâché, Benaras for jewelry and textiles, and so on.

• FLAWS IN HINDUISM; A BLESSING IN DISGUISE:
The social evils of Hindu society and the peaceful efforts of Muslim missionaries were the main causes of conversion to Islam. Hinduism had evils such as notorious caste system and social lacks. At this front, Islam was viewed as sigh of relief and complete code of conduct particularly for low-caste Hindus and Buddhists.

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